Hack:
Pretotype It! Make sure you’re building the right “it” before you build it right.
Pretotypes are quick, cheap, revealed-preference tests to validate whether a breakthrough innovation is appealing to its market. Pretotype tests occur immediately after a breakthrough idea is born, but well before significant investment is made in development. Pretotyping benefits Inventors* (who get to take action on more of their ideas), Investors (who get rapid, risk-managed plans to build confidence in innovations), and the economy (saving vast resources currently wasted on developing solutions which no-one wants).
*For purposes of this Hack, Inventor = Innovator. Please don’t write with your elaborate theories on why the two roles are different. I like how it plays off the term Investor!
Pretotyping solves a problem of market failure within the breakthrough innovation process. Inventors (those who come up with novel solutions) appeal to Investors (senior executives who control development resources, most critically time and permission) for funding to pursue their ideas. The problem is that, although company leaders often ask Inventors to dream up bold solutions representing attractive new markets, in practice the more radical the idea proposed, the less it resembles the current business the Investor group typically has responsibility for. This agency problem, in which Investors are the sponsors of innovation but are rewarded for optimizing short-term business, causes the reflexive rejection of the best and boldest ideas.
Think of the problem as two subconditions of the Innovator’s Dilemma, to resolve which companies must learn to balance the pursuit of current business with the exploration of new opportunities:
- The Inventor’s Nightmare: spending months or years developing a product or service that no-one wants. Most entrepreneurs and Inventors within companies want to work on successful projects, defined as marketplace success. Yet most innovations don’t fail because of either poor marketing/launch effort, or poor operation of the product or service. In most cases failure happens not because the team built “it” wrong, but because they built the wrong “it”!
- The Investor’s Nightmare: funding spurious-sounding business case proposals while anticipating complete failure. Most Investors are inclined to reject breakthrough innovation proposals because the market projections are works of creative fiction, and thus the development cost “ask” is a likely losing bet. This may well be an artifact of the funding process, that requires Inventors to fabricate numbers that hit an arbitrary hurdle rate, but in any case the idea probably sounds like a loony waste of time and money to the average Investor.
These two subconditions manifest in two wasteful results:
- False Positives: Inventors get so excited by their ideas they risk overinvesting in them before they’ve been proven attractive to their markets. Inventors’ infectious enthusiasm and passion trumps rational analysis, and a large team gets funded to “go build it”.
- False Negatives: Investors become so reflexively skeptical of crazy-sounding ideas that they risk underinvesting in them before they’ve had a chance in the marketplace. They make the easy decision to not swing the company’s bat, and refocus all concerned on the next opportunity.
Pretotyping replaces this emotional, speculative, opinion-based innovation market for early-stage funding with a quest for confidence-building data.
Pretotyping begins with a breakthrough idea - this is the Inventor’s “it” to be tested. Simpler, evolutionary ideas do not require pretotyping as demand has already been validated for the basic offer, and vectors of improvement desired by customers are usually well understood.
The first step is to isolate one or more demand-sensitive (“Do they want it?”) questions that must be answered to understand if this is the right “it”. Think of the most likely target customers, and ask what aspect of the “it” will need to be confirmed. In the case of a new user-interface design, such as the iPhone’s touch screen, the right first question might be “Will people use their fingertips to control the phone (vs a stylus or keypad)?”.
When Jeff Hawkins of Palm Computing was thinking of what became the Palm Pilot PDA, his main concern was whether users would adapt from carrying a paper diary/organizer to a pocket-sized electronic device. Hawkins’ pretotype test was to wrap a block of wood about the size of a deck of cards with a piece of paper printed with his first thoughts on a UI for the device. Hawkins carried this utterly non-functioning (and therefore emphatically not a prototype!) artifact in his shirt pocket for a week or so, miming his interactions with it every time he had a need to check his schedule or make a note. His pretotype test not only validated that he - as a proxy for his customers - would use the device, it also confirmed which functions were most useful, thereby refining down the list of features built into the first working model.
Having defined a clear “Do they want it?” question, the next challenge is to select a pretotype mode that best suits the task of exposing the offer to customers. Remember that the test does not have to feature a working offer, or even a facsimile; it merely needs to establish interest in the “it”. Several pretotype modes are available, in ascending order of complexity and cost:
- “The Fake Door” is good for testing the initial level of interest in as-yet unbuilt products or services. The test captures the % of those exposed to the offer who are interested enough to respond (by e.g., calling or clicking through). Examples: a brochure for an unbuilt product; a search engine keyword campaign, e.g., Google AdWords.
- “The Pinocchio” is good for testing the appeal of the basic form factor and esthetics of a proposed new offer. Example: a wood or composite model, e.g., Hawkins’ Palm Pilot dummy.
- “The Mechanical Turk” is good for testing the initial level of interest in product or service that depends upon as-yet unbuilt complex technology such as software or hardware.Example: human expertise used to simulate artificial intelligence proposed for an app.
- “The Impersonator” is good for testing the initial level of interest in as-yet unbuilt products or services that require full-scale exposure to customers. Especially valuable for food and beverage products. Example: repackaged or re-”skinned” existing product masquerading as a developed product.
- “The One-Night Stand” is good for testing the initial level of interest in a service experience whose customer benefits depend upon the complex interactions between several environmental factors. Example: a pop-up or temporary service environment such as a kiosk.
- “The Minimum Viable Product”* is good for testing the initial level of interest in the core functions of a largely undeveloped product. This is the transition point to more traditional prototyping. Example: a working prototype with bare minimum functionality.
* The term MVP is credited to Eric Ries, author of The Lean Startup.
Pretotypes generate two types of data that can progressively build confidence in a breakthrough innovation:
- Initial Level of Interest (ILI): this is the % of a target group exposed to the pretotype that acted to express an interest. A simple ratio of the number who try your “it” to the number exposed to the pretotype offer.
- Ongoing Level of Interest (OLI): beware, you can sell anything once! OLI tracks the proportion of those initially interested (from the ILI test) who are still interested in later test periods.
These two metrics allow Inventors and Investors to reach easy agreement on the parameters of pretotype tests, by means of a quick discussion about how many of what type of customers should receive a pretotype offer, and what level of interest will be considered a success. If the first round test produces encouraging ILI numbers, then a second round of testing to confirm a robust OLI should be an easy decision. If the trend over several rounds reveals a settled or growing pattern, further development follows; unfortunately, the odds are that OLI reveals a downward pattern in market interest, and development resources should be diverted to other projects. In either case the learning has been extremely efficient.
This makes for a third, and much more powerful, outcome: a new type of dialog between Inventors and Investors, based on a shared quest for real data about the desirability of new “its” rather than a shell-game of artificial hurdles and spurious business cases.
Alberto Savoia, serial entrepreneur and ex-Googler, coined the term Pretotyping in 2010. Jeremy Clark has been collaborating with Alberto to develop pretotyping as a response to both the high rate of failures among breakthrough innovations and the systematic bias against breakthroughs within corporate innovation systems.
Pretotyping has been developed into two mini-books, available at pretotypelabs.com or as e-book downloads from Amazon:
"Pretotype It! Make sure you are building the right it before you build it right" by Alberto Savoia
"Pretotyping@Work: Invent Like a Startup, Invest Like a Grownup" by Jeremy Clark
Pretotyping principles have been taught at Stanford GSB and at a number of corporations in the US and Europe, where breakthrough innovation teams have applied the techniques and metrics with significant success.
Nice hack, Jeremy. Do you think the http://www.kickstarter.com/ community is a good testing ground for pretotypes? Or is that too far into prototypes?
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Hi Joachim, and thanks. I like Kickstarter as an open marketplace for funding innovation, and I do think it can be a valid pretotyping platform, given that it can expose ideas to many potential users/buyers, rapidly and cheaply. I have three minor concerns:
1) Kickstarter is clearly optimized for consumer ideas; testing B2B ideas this way would be harder.
2) It is aimed at Investors rather than customers: Kickstarter pitches ask the question "Do you want to invest in this?". Of course this question has some overlap with "Do you want this?" but only in the cases where I pledge to invest because I consider myself a likely buyer too. It would be important to design the Kickstarter pitch to avoid any bias here.
3)) It reveals the Inventors' idea (the final "it"), in full. Most clients I've worked with are shy about their IP at early stages! In this case, the fix might be to disguise the brand making the pitch, and the team may feel that the advantages of rapid learning may offset the cost of tipping off the competition.
So I'd advocate using Kickstarter or similar crowdfunding platforms at a later stage of testing, when more of the attributes and features of the final "it" have been validated by simpler pretotypes.
Thanks for the comment,
Jeremy
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Like this a great deal. Curious about a possible difference between MVP from a startup versus something from a larger firm. Most startups are also startup brands - if they fail, there is no impact on the brand. Even the investors have set expectations that a few big wins will carry the portfolio.
Things seem a little different for large established firms. The investors generally dont like to signal that they are failing with most of the new investments and testing in any meaningful visible way, tends to scare the marketing folks because they are carefully tending to the brand.
What can be done to decouple some of the risk?
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Great question, Shaun. I agree that Investors within established firms are at least as averse to risking damage to the brand with a public failure, as they are to "wasting" resources in the attempt. Corporate Investors don't seem as concerned with the risk of slow erosion of that brand value if the firm fails to innovate.
First, firms can avoid risking brand damage entirely by beginning with the friendliest audiences: employees (think Google's "dogfooding" technique) and alpha- or lead-customers. The second strategy is to only expose a small - but representative - fraction of the target customer base to the pretotype by carefully targeting the test e.g., by limiting geographic exposure. In most cases a good test result can be provided by the reactions of a few dozen customers.
In the B2C environment the third risk mitigation strategy is to decouple the brand from the pretotype test altogether. An established brand stands for a set of attributes in consumers' minds, but from the Inventor's POV, those assets are liabilities. Given that the brand calls to mind core offers that probably differ significantly from that under test, brand perceptions may well skew consumers' reaction to the pretotype offer. So in this case I advocate for either muting or disguising the brand (and/or parent company identity) in presenting the pretotype offer, if to do so could cause confusion and potentially produce unreliable data (which is the exact bias that focus groups introduce). Remember, Inventors initially need a neutral test of offer desirability, untainted by consumers' view of the parent brand.
It's different in the B2B environment, where the brand risk is magnified because most B2B firms have a relatively small number of deep customer relationships, to jeopardize any one of which could be disastrous. In the B2B world, many new offers have clear benefits but come with significant switching costs such as new production methods or equipment. The virtue of a pretotype is to shine early light on the tradeoffs between benefits and costs a customer would face. In this case, the smart way to manage risk is to sacrifice a little of the surprise value of pretotype offers. The firm can discuss with one or more customers and agree in advance to a pretotyping relationship: the supplier firm declares that it will expose very early-stage offers to the customer, in exchange for confidentiality and a measure of tolerance that the offers so exposed will be conceptual in nature i.e., not ready for prime time. The customer and supplier can then explore the cost-benefit tradeoff openly. In this case, some of the pretotyping techniques become redundant (e.g., the Fake Door).
To your point about how startups get funded, the real power of pretotyping is the mindset that Inventors can be more disciplined about their march towards the final solution desired by the market. When startups do this it's called "pivoting" the product, and it usually happens only after earlier product versions are overdeveloped relative to valid market feedback. Pretotyping provides a framework in which the need to pivot can be discovered - and new pivots tested - in a rapid, systematic way. I think VCs ought to demand this kind of discipline from their portfolio companies, with a view to improving their ROI.
Thanks again for your comment.
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Thanks @Jeremy.
Appreciate the finer points between B2C and B2B risks.
In terms of disguising brands, one of my favorite examples is giffgaff.com (very different mobile services offering in the UK, from O2). O2 team recognized that their proposed changes together deserved a "new" brand. It seems to have worked out well, so far. The giffgaff brand is built around rapid testing of new ideas, most of which come from customers.
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You give as good as you get, @Shaun. Thanks for sharing the giffgaff example: having looked at the website, I agree it's a terrific platform for crowdsourcing ideas to develop and test new offers rapidly. Giving it a new brand distances the parent O2 brand from the high loss-ratio that comes with experimentation, and the social aspect syndicates ownership of both the ideas and the offers that emerge from them.
I always like learning of new cases/examples. Thanks.
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Very interesting.
I'm curious to know how PRETOTYPING can be done for service industry.
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Thanks for your question, Heminda. The simple answer is, pretotyping for services is very easy, although typically a subset of the pretotype modes I describe above is most applicable. The most appropriate pretotypes are the Fake Door (asserting that an offer actually exists), Mechanical Turk (humans mimic complex technology), and One-Night Stand (pop-up version of full service).
Some examples should help illustrate. I recently worked with a group from a large bank who used all of these techniques to experiment with new B2C and B2B service offerings, as follows:
- One team designed a Fake Door test for a new service offering trade advice to the bank's business customers. The test took the form of an invitation posted on the "closeout screen" of the web platform already used by their target customers. The number clicking through to express interest represented the ILI measure.
- Another team designed a Mechanical Turk solution to test whether customers would value an app that would let them know in real time what the lines were like in their local branch before setting out. A toll-free phone line and dedicated staff member reporting estimated wait times was enough to test ILI for the app.
- A third team designed a One-Night Stand to test whether bundled retail financial services (aka a one-stop-shop) was more desirable to the bank's senior customers (than offering each service à la carte). The idea was to invite target customers who already had accounts with the bank to a financial services fair, at which bank representatives would offer free advice on individual products or services (e.g., investing, insurance, managing accounts online, etc); there would also be a booth at which the customers could discuss the integration of all aspects of money management. Entrance to the fair was free, but each customer's time slot was limited, forcing customers to choose whether to spend their slot at the bundled services booth or with one or more individual specialists.
I hope these examples give a flavor of what is possible without needing to overbuild a service offering ahead of demand validation. An important aspect of each one of these tests is limited scale: a few branches, one or two financial services events, messages out to a few hundred customers...
Thanks again for your question.
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